Mercy Amid Terror? The Role of Amnesties during Russia's Civil War by Rendle, M
1 
 
Mercy amid Terror? The Role of Amnesties during Russia’s Civil War 
 




Russia’s civil war was a period of escalating violence as the Bolsheviks struggled to retain 
power, yet it was also a period of numerous amnesties. This article analyses the nature and 
impact of these amnesties, and explores their value to the Bolsheviks. These amnesties were 
not a sign of mercy; they never admitted mistakes or granted innocence, but excused or 
underplayed crimes and their significance. Instead, amnesties had a range of practical and 
political functions for the state, not least of which was to act as a ‘safety valve’ to release 
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Russia’s civil war was a period of escalating violence as the Bolsheviks struggled desperately 
to maintain their hold on power. Horrific tales of acts of terror dominate contemporary 
accounts and the Bolsheviks’ ruthlessness undoubtedly played a significant role in their 
victory. Yet this period, one of the most violent in Russia’s history, also saw one of the 
greatest frequencies of amnesties. One study has noted eleven official amnesties between 
1918 and 1921 in Russia,
1
 but in reality there were more, especially if the territory of the 
former Russian empire is included. Some amnesties released entire categories of criminals, whilst 
others targeted particular social or political groups, or related to specific crimes or localities. The most 
frequent and wide-ranging were what one scholar has referred to as ‘hybrid amnesties’; they released 
certain types of criminals and reduced punishment for others.
2
 Overall, amnesties benefitted tens of 
thousands of people, even as violence continued to increase. 
This article analyses the nature and impact of these amnesties, exploring their purpose 
and value to the Bolsheviks. The texts of amnesty decrees reveal little about the state’s 
intentions beyond noting that the Bolsheviks were in a position of relative strength and able to 
dispense mercy to their enemies, displaying the ‘humane’ nature of the proletarian state. 
Newspapers provided little additional commentary when they published the decrees and there 
was little discussion in contemporary publications until after 1922. Then legal theorists 
extended earlier points; amnesties reflected communist ‘humanity’, delivering mercy to 
workers and peasants who had inadvertently committed crimes through a lack of 
consciousness, material hardship or pressure from anti-Bolshevik forces.
3
 That the proletarian 





 Some jurists provided retrospective justification based on broader views of 
crime and punishment. B. S. Utevskii, for example, argued that crime was socially dangerous 
and that punishment corresponds to the level of that danger. If the level of danger changes, 
whether due to changes in a person’s character or socio-political circumstances, the 
punishment should change. This was fair and permitted people who were no longer dangerous 
to return to socially useful work.
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There was no such justification provided during the civil war, however, either publicly 
or privately. Why then did the state issue so many amnesties in this period? Did they reflect 
mercy or broader understandings of crime and punishment? Were they an attempt to educate 
or rehabilitate? Or were amnesties forced on the state by practical concerns? These questions 
have rarely been addressed by historians. Soviet legal histories ignored amnesties, whilst a 
few specialist studies reiterated the claims of mercy made by contemporaries and did not 
analyse how amnesties operated in practice.
6
 Western studies have focused on repression, 
making only passing mentions of civil war amnesties and proposing various motivations, 
from benevolent (and largely symbolic) acts designed to improve the state’s image, to part of 
the re-centralization of authority, to a need to reduce the prison population.
7
 
 This article argues that amnesties were applied systematically by officials at all levels 
driven by directives from the state. Examining the implementation of amnesties, moreover, 
reveals that even individuals who were excluded on paper often benefitted in practice as the 
state encouraged officials to apply amnesties generously. This complicates the usual view of 
the civil war as a period of uninterrupted violence; in reality, the interaction of justice (as 
represented by amnesties) and violence was complex. 
The purpose of amnesties, as with the justice system generally, was multifaceted. 
They acted as a crucial ‘safety valve’,8 relieving pressure on overstretched courts and prisons, 
and reducing tensions between state and society. This impact may have been short-lived, and 
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a reduction or increase in repression could have had a similar effect, but both were deemed 
undesirable. Whilst the former was considered too risky, the latter was increasingly seen to 
have a limited impact. Strictly enforcing decrees on food requisitioning, taxes, private trade or 
desertion required the arrest of innumerable people, something far beyond the scope of a 
fledgling security apparatus fighting threats on a number of fronts. As it was, thousands were 
investigated and arrested. Amnesties relieved these pressures and, by frequently targeting 
lower social groups, provided substance to the state’s claims to be a workers’ and peasants’ 
government, and they were compatible with arguments surrounding the causes of crime and 
the role of punishment. They removed temporarily the need to prosecute particular crimes and 
released people without admitting to mistakes that would undermine the authority of courts. 
People had still committed crimes, but for condonable reasons. Finally, in tandem with the 
New Economic Policy (NEP) after 1921, amnesties helped draw a line under the civil war and 
establish a post-conflict equilibrium between state and society. 
 This article analyses amnesties through their impact on revolutionary tribunals in 
European Russia, with some use of material from other courts and from across the former 
Russian Empire.
9
 The Decree on Courts, published on 24 November 1917, created tribunals to 
judge counter-revolutionary threats, profiteering, speculation, sabotage and other ‘political’ 
crimes, rather than ‘normal’ crimes such as murder or theft, which were left to people’s 
courts. The first cases were heard in December in Petrograd and most provincial towns had 
their own tribunals by spring 1918. In May 1918, a supreme tribunal was created in Moscow 
under the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Congress of Soviets (VTsIK), 
which came to supervise all civilian tribunals. In late 1918 and 1919, tribunals were also 
established across the military and the transport network. Initially, these new tribunals 
answered to the military authorities and the Commissariat of the Means of Communications 
respectively. In March 1920, however, all tribunals were placed directly under the authority of 
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VTsIK. This basic structure remained until 1922 when civilian tribunals were abolished. 
Tribunals have been seen to epitomize the use of the justice system to implement political 
violence so their adoption of amnesties emphasizes the existence of a more complex picture. 
Tribunals also dealt with a wider range of crimes than their mandate suggested as most crimes 
were ‘political’ in some sense, thus allowing broad insights into amnesties. Nonetheless, 
amnesties were also applied by people’s courts (which dealt with many more crimes) and 
other organs that dispensed sentences (most obviously, the secret police or Cheka). The scale 
and impact of amnesties, therefore, was even greater than argued below. 
 
The Amnesty Decrees 
 
Amnesties were a feature of Russian history prior to the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power in 
October 1917. Muscovy saw many, from the genuinely merciful to the cynically deceptive.
10
 
They continued to a lesser extent in Imperial Russia, culminating in an amnesty as part of the 
Romanov tercentenary celebrations in 1913. The expectation among liberal and moderate 
elements in society that an amnesty would be issued suggests that they remained common at 
such times.
11
 Equally, one of the first acts of the Provisional Government after taking power 
during the February Revolution was to issue a celebratory amnesty for political prisoners.
12
 
The Bolsheviks did not issue an amnesty on taking power, but amnesties remained 
associated with celebration. The first amnesties in Soviet Russia came when at least two local 
authorities felt that it would be an obvious way of celebrating the first anniversary of the 
February Revolution. Bezhetskii uezd soviet (Tver’ province) amnestied those imprisoned for 
‘unimportant’ crimes (mainly theft), entrusting the task to its investigative commission. 
Twenty-four people were released, ten of whom had been in prison since before the October 
Revolution. The local prison authorities were uneasy, informing the national board for prisons 
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who, in turn, asked Commissariat of Justice (Narkomiust) whether it was legal for local 
authorities to release those guilty of what it saw as ‘important’ crimes. Narkomiust replied 
that it was not and ordered the prosecution of the commission, but the matter was dropped 
once it became clear that various local authorities were complicit.
13
 A similar amnesty in 
Timskii uezd (Kursk province) prompted the same reaction from Narkomiust.
14
 
 More significant was the amnesty issued in Petrograd as part of the May Day 
celebrations in 1918. The circumstances remain vague. City officials seem to have wanted to 
regain public support and ease overcrowded prisons, which were causing problems with food, 
housing and disease, as well as antagonizing Kronstadt sailors, whose base was used as an 
overflow. The situation was so desperate by January 1918 that Lenin recommended that a 
third to a half of all prisoners should be transferred to provincial prisons where food supplies 
were better.
15
 This did not occur and officials considered alternatives, deciding on an amnesty 
on 27 April. At the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region (which included Petrograd) 
on 29 April, the city’s party leader, G. E. Zinov’ev, argued that individual opponents no 
longer posed a threat, and had been defeated by workers and peasants who did not wish to 
treat their enemies in the same manner as bourgeois states.
16
 Eighty-four delegates voted for 
an amnesty, seventeen against and fifteen abstained. The proposal was then passed by 
Petrograd’s soviet.17 The amnesty freed all prisoners with less than six months left, those who 
had committed political crimes, those over seventy years old and halved the sentences of 
serious cases. It excluded bribe-takers, traitors and speculators and had several other caveats. 
It covered all crimes committed before 1 May, even if not yet resolved.
18
 
 Narkomiust was dismayed, fearing that the last few months’ work would be undone 
and demanded that obvious counter-revolutionaries were excluded.
19
 Petrograd officials were 
defensive, claiming that the initiative had come from local legal organs and that the amnesty 
would free no more than fifteen people, mainly those involved in an anti-soviet plot led by V. 
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M. Purishkevich, a notorious monarchist, none of whom had more than two months left on 
their sentences.
20
 In truth, these individuals had years left on their sentences and the amnesty 
freed many more people. A Menshevik newspaper estimated that around two hundred would 
benefit, many of whom were criminals or high-profile enemies who deserved imprisonment, 
like Purishkevich.
21
 Case files prove that the amnesty was widely invoked. Broad definitions 
of what constituted a ‘political’ crime enabled many to claim eligibility successfully. Some 
stopped contesting their case, instead noting that the accusations, even if incorrect, fell within 
the amnesty’s terms.22 The numbers were sufficient for Petrograd’s tribunal to produce a pre-
printed release form to ease the process, with a gap for the defendant’s name above a generic 
statement that the defendant should be released under the amnesty.
23
 
 Rumours spread that the amnesty would be extended to the whole country.
24
 It was 
not, but it was reported in local papers,
25
 and some authorities followed Petrograd’s lead. In 
early June, legal officials in Penza proposed publishing Petrograd’s amnesty verbatim, 
arguing that it would lead to a ‘significant reduction’ in their workload, but they faced ‘mass 
opposition’ led by the local Cheka. Instead, the officials asked the government to extend the 
amnesty.
26
 The same occurred in Siberia, whilst elsewhere the authorities in Arkhangel’sk did 
adopt Petrograd’s amnesty.27 Narkomiust was livid: a dubious amnesty was spreading and, 
equally worryingly, local authorities were acting independently just as the state was trying to 
strengthen control from Moscow. On 6 June, responding to the Siberian proposal, Narkomiust 
stated that only the central authorities could issue amnesties.
28
 This order was repeated by P. 
I. Stuchka, then Commissar of Justice, at a congress of local justice officials on 6 July when 
he declared that the state was focused on expediency not mercy. Petrograd’s amnesty had 
freed ‘undesirables’ who should be in prison, whilst others had released robbers. There must 
be no more local amnesties.
29
 A few days later, the new constitution reinforced his point; only 





 This power was exercised on 6 November 1918. At the Sixth All-Russian Exceptional 
Congress of Soviets, L. B. Kamenev, a senior party figure, proposed a national amnesty, 
coinciding with the anniversary of the October Revolution. The proletarian state was strong 
enough, he argued, to show ‘mercy’ to those prepared to lay down their arms and recognize 
its authority.
31
 All those arrested on suspicion of being involved with plots or oppositional 
groups would be released if their guilt was not proven within two weeks. All hostages would 
be freed (a common practice during the civil war to combat organized resistance) except 
where they were held in response to hostages seized by opponents. Finally, all courts would 
re-examine all cases with a view to releasing those who did not endanger the state. VTsIK 
was responsible for organizing the amnesty, with soviets taking over locally. The scale of the 
struggle was emphasized and the need for harsh measures, but that the Red Army’s success 
permitted mercy. The word ‘amnesty’ was not used in the decree, but it was in Izvestiia and 
Pravda, who both printed the text in full.
32
 
The regime may have been trying to diffuse the criticism that surrounded its policy of 
‘red terror’ after 5 September following an attempt on Lenin’s life. Kamenev stated that an 
amnesty would combat the ‘lies and libel’ spreading in Russia and the western press about the 
Cheka’s activities and methods.33 Cheka leaders themselves noted later in a private meeting 
that the amnesty would help convince those wavering in their support.
34
 Tensions between 
state and society had grown throughout 1918; there was opposition to the reintroduction of the 
death penalty in June, rising support for rival socialist parties, frequent revolts, and more 
arrests from a wider range of social groups. The regime probably felt the need to ease these 
tensions, whilst the text promised that the amnesty would regulate judicial organs to ensure 
they worked in a rational and fair manner, targeting only real enemies. 
Yet this decree was not as generous on paper as the Petrograd amnesty: most prisoners 
would have their guilt proven within a fortnight; the categories of eligible crimes were vague; 
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and terror continued. Moreover, on 15 November, the presidium of the Cheka demanded that 
provocateurs, former tsarist police and officials, Black Hundred activists, spies, saboteurs, 
counter-revolutionary agitators (particularly priests, officials and those in the Red Army) and 
those convicted for stealing explosives and arms were excluded. VTsIK agreed.
35
 
 Nonetheless, amnesties became a regular act after November 1918 for the rest of the 
civil war; one formed an important part of the anniversary celebrations of the October 
Revolution, whilst another was issued around April-May each year, although not always tied 
to the May Day celebrations. Additional amnesties focused on specific crimes. Broadly 
speaking, several trends are visible. First, amnesties became more generous, possibly as the 
various bodies involved became used to them and less fearful of their consequences. Second, 
Narkomiust took responsibility for them as part of the greater centralization of legal affairs 
and state matters more generally, leading to greater regulation and the creation of instructions 
on their implementation. Finally, some groups fared better than others in each amnesty, 
indicating the state’s changing concerns across this period. 
 These trends were visible in three amnesties issued in 1919. On 23 February 1919, an 
amnesty celebrated the first anniversary of the creation of the Red Army. It released all those 
involved in disorder and mass crimes as long as these did not have a ‘white guard’ character, 
or involve robbery, rape or arson; all those imprisoned for first-time desertion; all those guilty 
of ill-discipline (if not part of a white guard plot); and all those imprisoned for military crimes 
who agreed to return to service in the Red Army.
36
 On 25 April, another amnesty urged courts 
to re-examine cases again and release those no longer posing a danger. This decree was 
directed at workers and peasants caught up in the escalating unrest. All those who were not 
organizers, instigators or leaders, but became involved through a lack of ‘consciousness’, 
should be released, as should those involved in unorganized unrest.
37
 Finally, on 5 November, 
there was an extensive two-part amnesty marking the second anniversary of the October 
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Revolution. The main decree released all prisoners except those involved in plots or armed 
struggle, or who had committed ‘selfish’ crimes for personal gain [korystnye prestupleniia]. 
Those ineligible but with sentences of over five years’ imprisonment would see them reduced 
to five years. Deserters sentenced to death would have this reduced to five years in prison. 
Deserters with lesser sentences were given the option, if repentant, to accept a fine and return 
to the front, whilst those on the run would be pardoned if they gave themselves in by 25 
November. Local commissions were created to implement the amnesty with representatives 
from the soviet, Cheka and tribunals, whilst Narkomiust took national responsibility. Another 
decree on the same day amnestied imprisoned members of rival political parties if they were 
willing to defend the state, unless they had actively participated in counter-revolution.
38
 
 As amnesties became more complex, local officials struggled to enact them correctly. 
Some turned to Narkomiust with queries; some proceeded on the basis of mistaken 
interpretations; others became mired in confusion. Narkomiust produced instructions from 
November 1919 to clear up misunderstandings; it clarified that ‘selfish’ crimes included 
speculation and the dereliction of duties, and gave guidance on altering prison sentences. It 
also provided a timescale: commissions enacting the amnesty should finish by December, 
although courts had another month to re-examine their cases.
39
 The queries continued, though, 
as officials still found subsequent decrees confusing.
40
 The fact that local courts issued a 
wider range of sentences than Narkomiust expected or condoned exacerbated confusion, 
creating categories of prisoners whose status under various amnesties was unclear. Various 
central justice organs provided increasing clarity as they sent successive decrees to local 
officials, structuring instructions around lists of crimes or the various stages in the legal 
process, detailing the required action in each case.
41
 In November 1922, ten thousand copies 





 The November 1919 amnesty set the tone for the future. The blanket reduction of 
sentences, irrespective of the seriousness of the crime, was extended in future amnesties. 
Policies on deserters were repeated, betraying concern over staffing the fledgling Red Army. 
Along with the focus on workers and peasants, this was no doubt designed to convince people 
that the state remained their ‘proletarian’ government despite repressive supply and 
conscription policies. The olive branch held out to political opponents was an attempt to 
undermine support for rival parties as internal debates grew within them over how they should 
act as the civil war intensified. All this reflected the use of amnesties as a tool to help tackle 
current political problems. 
 The amnesties of 1920-2 were variations of the 1919 model.
43
 Counter-revolutionaries 
(active participants in the war) remained excluded as, increasingly, were bandits, professional 
thieves and repeat offenders. The theme of redemption appears more frequently, particularly 
for potentially productive individuals; the amnesty on 1 May 1920, for example, urged the 
release of all those willing to participate in the economic struggle to redeem their crimes. In 
contrast, recidivists were unproductive and irredeemable. In May 1920, ‘harmful’ speculators 
were excluded, but a year later, after the start of the NEP in March 1921 had initiated a new 
tax in kind on peasants, an amnesty on 29 April focused exclusively on those sentenced for 
not fulfilling food quotas or paying taxes, and for trading (speculating) in food, raw materials 
and fodder. This amnesty aimed to demonstrate that the Bolsheviks were serious about the 
NEP by offering mercy to those convicted under former policies. Moreover, as the November 
1922 amnesty clarified, the state increasingly distinguished between crimes committed due to 
material need, as much so-called speculation had been, and crimes committed for profit. Most 
obviously, profitable activities surrounding the production, sale and trade of illegally-brewed 
alcohol were firmly excluded from amnesties. 
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 By 1921, victory in the civil war was becoming assured and amnesties reflected the 
need to come to terms with the war’s legacy.44 Thus, as well as the more nuanced view of 
speculation, an amnesty was offered on 3 November 1921 for workers and peasants who 
fought in the White armies and were now in prison or exile. A day later, an amnesty was 
offered to workers and peasants involved in the Kronstadt Revolt. Views of banditry also 
became more flexible, with a focus on leaders or organizers, rather than the masses involved. 
The Bolsheviks used terms that refuted any change of policy; for example, people who had 
been ‘deceived’ into fighting for the Whites would be shown mercy, as would those whose 
‘lack of consciousness’ led to their involvement in revolts. But the end result was a desire to 
ease growing conflict between state and society,
45
 something also evident in the instructions 
to the November 1922 amnesty. These highlighted twenty-five areas affected by famine in 
1921-2 and encouraged officials there to release those convicted of crimes such as theft and 
speculation, irrespective of their sentences.
46
 
 Later amnesties were also more precise. The November 1921 amnesty was typical, 
releasing all those with less than a year remaining in prison; halving the sentences of those 
with 1-3 years remaining; reducing by a third those with 3-5 years left; and capping the 
maximum sentence at five years. The death penalty was often changed to five years in prison. 
Instructions accompanying the amnesty described how specific crimes should be treated. 
Narkomiust seemed to be trying to make implementing amnesties an objective process, 
leaving no room for local initiative and thus inconsistencies. In 1922, new criminal law codes 
enabled Narkomiust to refer to standard definitions of crimes. 
 All of the above amnesties were issued in Moscow, but amnesties were also issued by 
fledgling soviet governments in newly-established autonomous regions from 1919 onwards.
47
 
These followed a similar template to Moscow, although there were always slight differences. 
Some regions saw amnesties as an opportunity to assert independence and facilitate the state-
13 
 
building process. In Georgia, a May Day amnesty in 1921 promising to pardon all those who 
had formerly opposed it was entitled ‘Decree No. 1’, suggesting that it was seen as the 
foundation stone of the new republic.
48
 Similarly, the timing of Ukrainian amnesties – in 
October to coincide with its annual congress of soviets rather than November – was intended 
to emphasize that amnesties served their concerns not Moscow’s.49 
Moscow reacted differently to these amnesties. It was happy to publish Ukrainian 
amnesties in newspapers and help enact them where possible,
50
 but a debate erupted when 
Turkestan published an amnesty in November 1921 without the authorization of VTsIK. 
VTsIK wanted to preserve its authority across all republics and the supreme tribunal also 
wanted the power to sanction it, as they did other amnesties.
51
 Moscow also acted when areas 
of confusion emerged, particularly in military and railway tribunals, whose jurisdiction often 
crossed boundaries. After the Ukrainian amnesty in May 1920, the main railway tribunal 
asked whether this affected railways running into the Ukraine.
52
 In November 1921, Orenburg 
military tribunal, whose jurisdiction stretched across the Kirgiz border, asked Narkomiust 
which amnesty to apply.
53
 Moscow asserted its authority both times. Narkomiust regarded 
these amnesties as another challenge to its attempts to centralize authority, but it could do 
little once republics had established their own state apparatus and court systems. 
 
Implementation and Impact 
 
Amnesties only mattered, of course, if they were actually implemented and the archives reveal 
that amnesties were applied systematically by organs at all levels, encouraged repeatedly by 
VTsIK and Narkomiust. And, surprisingly, amnesties were more generous in practice than on 
paper. As has been seen, many local soviets believed amnesties would benefit their own 
activities, whilst others quickly adjusted to the state’s changing stance on amnesties during 
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1918. The justice department in Moscow province, for instance, rejected on 24 October 1918 
a proposal by local courts for an amnesty to celebrate the forthcoming anniversary of the 
October Revolution, no doubt influenced by the official line on amnesties at this stage.
54
 
However, it quickly implemented the amnesty instigated by VTsIK a fortnight later. Records 
suggest that over seventy-six benefitted, most accused of counter-revolutionary activities, 
including misuse of official power, undermining authority, drunkenness and hooliganism. A 
few – including speculators, murderers and saboteurs – benefitted from the nebulous section 
in VTsIK’s decree permitting the release of those who no longer posed any danger to the 
state, which would have otherwise been easy to dismiss as purely symbolic.
55
 
 A year later, Tula’s officials played out a by-then typical scenario. The amnesty of 5 
November 1919 was discussed by justice officials in the provincial soviet on 12 November. 
As instructed by Narkomiust, a temporary commission was formed to enact the amnesty ten 
days later. It asked for clarification on certain points, but by the end of the month, as required 
officially, it claimed to have re-examined the cases of most inmates in the provincial prison to 
determine eligibility.
56
 By 1920-1, provinces routinely established commissions involving all 
relevant bodies – local departments of justice, people’s courts, tribunals, the Cheka, prison 
officials – to implement amnesties and review problematic cases.57 Amnesties were published 
in local newspapers and provincial organs often reissued key elements, such as the reductions 
in sentences, for distribution within the province.
58
 
Amnesties could be enacted at the end of a trial, after guilt had been confirmed and a 
sentence pronounced, or they could be applied later. Courts were supposed to re-examine all 
existing cases after an amnesty, but were often prompted by appeals from defendants or their 
lawyers. If a defendant felt that a decision was incorrect, they often protested and the case 
would go to the cassation department of the supreme tribunal, with the decision confirmed by 
the presidium of VTsIK. As it was responsible for amnesties, Narkomiust also responded to 
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appeals sent to it directly. In addition, the supreme tribunal asked to see the results of each 
tribunal’s decisions on amnesties, which took the form of long lists of individuals, crimes and 
resolutions. If anything in these lists seemed irregular, the supreme tribunal intervened, asking 
for the decision to be reviewed or altered. Narkomiust did the same for any questionable 
decisions that came to its attention. 
 I have not found comprehensive statistics on those benefiting from amnesties in these 
years.
59
 Narkomiust requested information on amnesties from local justice officials so there 
are statistics on the impact of particular amnesties in individual provinces. A sense of scale 
can also be gained from the incomplete lists gathered by the supreme tribunal. Ultimately, 
however, the impact of each amnesty varied across Russia for no discernible reason, although 
local efficiency (both in terms of implementing amnesties and keeping accurate records) and 
local crime rates no doubt played a role. Provinces close to the military fronts of the civil war, 
for instance, faced greater pressures from desertion, food supply revolts and speculation, 
sentenced more people for these crimes, and thus more were eligible for amnesties. 
Variations in impact were evident in the reports to Narkomiust on the November 1919 
amnesty. In Perm’, 613 of 1,022 prisoners (60 per cent) were freed, whilst thirty-nine had 
their sentences reduced and ten were refused amnesty because they still posed a danger to the 
state. In Kazan’, 462 were released, fifty-five received shorter sentences and ten were refused; 
in Riazan’, the figures were 221, seventeen and eighteen respectively. In Ekaterinburg, the 
tribunal freed twenty-five, eased the sentences of eight, refused amnesty to 143 and ended 138 
investigations, whilst people’s courts released 152, eased ninety-one sentences and refused 
amnesty to seventeen. In Orel, seventy-seven of ninety-three (83 per cent) imprisoned by 
tribunals were freed, five had their sentences reduced and eleven were refused. In Briansk, 
thirty-nine from fifty imprisoned by tribunals were freed (78 per cent), with eight reduced 
sentences and three refused.
60
 A year later in November 1920, Perm’’s tribunal considered 
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1,135 cases. From these, 192 cases (17 per cent) were affected: investigations into eighty-six 
(involving 203 individuals) were stopped, whilst 106 (involving 231 people) were reviewed. 
Seventy-seven people were freed, seventy-four had their sentences reduced by two-thirds and 
forty had them reduced by a third. Forty were refused amnesty. Almost 83 per cent of those 
sentences reviewed benefited.
61
 Another year on, Arkhangel’sk’s tribunal sentenced 303 
individuals from 1 January to 1 July 1921 of whom only twenty-nine (9.6 per cent) qualified 
for the November 1921 amnesty.
62
 These statistics suggest that many authorities did re-
consider every case, as instructed, and that thousands benefited, especially as the pressure 
from Narkomiust to implement amnesties increased over time. These figures are also just 
from tribunals: many more sentenced by people’s courts and the Cheka benefitted.63 
It is also clear that amnesties were applied to a wide range of crimes. Arkhangel’sk’s 
provincial camp for forced labour, for example, compiled a list of twenty-four individuals 
eligible for amnesty in November 1920. Their crimes included sympathizing with the Whites, 
desertion, theft, banditry, illegal brewing, corruption, speculation and being a ‘harmful 
element’. All had their sentences reduced.64 Banditry, in particular, was condemned across 
this period, yet those convicted of it were amnestied. Perhaps their involvement was seen to 
reflect a lack of consciousness, but disparities can be seen across tribunals. Some refused to 
discuss amnesty in cases of banditry, or even crimes such as desertion or murder; others 
applied amnesties to all crimes. Officials had to be careful. In July 1922, the Kalmytskii 
region was allowed to offer an amnesty for bandits to encourage people to return to ‘peaceful’ 
work after large-scale unrest, but Moscow prosecuted several officials for exceeding the terms 
of this amnesty by allowing the release of known leaders.
65
 
The most comprehensive statistics available chart the impact of the November 1920 
amnesty on ninety military tribunals. In total, 23,669 individuals benefitted from the amnesty; 
71.8 per cent of whom had been sentenced with the rest still under investigation. 61.3 per cent 
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were freed completely, 11.6 per cent received conditional freedom and 27.1 per cent had their 
sentences reduced. Of the latter, most (36.6 per cent) received a reduced sentence of five 
years (although 7.5 per cent remained with higher sentences), whilst of the 55.9 per cent with 
lower sentences, the majority had them reduced by a half or two-thirds. 77.8 per cent of these 
decisions were made in procedural rather than legal meetings of the tribunal and it was the 
first time that 96.5 per cent of cases had been submitted for amnesty.
66
 
 The final figures reveal two notable parts of the broader process. First, for 3.5 per cent 
of individuals, it was the second time (or more) that their case had been considered. Cases 
were re-examined under successive amnesties. Those initially refused were often declared 
eligible for a subsequent amnesty. The terms changed over time, as did the state’s concerns. 
Most obviously, former tsarist-era provocateurs were pursued by the authorities immediately 
after the October Revolution and were usually refused amnesty, but as the civil war 
intensified, they appeared less threatening and, consequently, were often released under later 
amnesties.
67
 Equally, although some amnesties stipulated whether or not someone was 
eligible who had already received a reduced sentence from a previous amnesty, others did not, 
and individuals had their sentences reduced in stages by successive amnesties, often at the 
urging of the supreme tribunal.
68
 It was even possible to apply multiple amnesties at the same 
time. P. V. Platonov was sentenced to two years in prison on 29 December 1922 for a crime 
committed on 14 January 1921. This could be immediately halved using the November 1921 
amnesty as the crime had been committed beforehand, leaving less than a year’s sentence, 
which made Platonov eligible for release under the November 1922 amnesty.
69
 
 The second notable point was that most cases were reviewed by procedural meetings. 
As mentioned, the instructions issued alongside amnesties reflected Narkomiust’s desire to 
remove arbitrariness on the part of local courts, turning amnesties into an administrative 
process where cases were assessed for their eligibility on types of crimes committed rather 
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than analysing the particulars of individual cases. Thus, amnesty records are often terse, 
providing little evidence of any discussion about the relative threats posed by different crimes 
or the role of different types of sentences. On 23 December 1918, a prosecutor wrote in his 
rebuttal to a defendant’s appeal that it was ‘strange’ that the tribunal had granted amnesty in a 
case of blackmail and corruption by an official without considering whether those concerned 
posed a danger to the revolution.
70
 As time passed, however, such comments disappeared and 
it became clear to all concerned that the amnesty process was largely administrative. 
Later amnesties did offer scope for judgement when deciding what was a ‘conscious’ 
action or what constituted a ‘selfish’ crime. Only occasionally, though, do records reveal the 
decision-making process. On 18 May 1920, Penza’s provincial tribunal heard the case of eight 
peasants accused of seizing livestock from poorer peasants and other crimes. All had their 
sentences reduced under the amnesties of November 1919 and May 1920 apart from one – the 
person who initiated the crimes. His actions were deemed deliberate and more serious.
71
 
When asked to reconsider a case by VTsIK in May 1920, Novgorod’s tribunal again rejected 
an amnesty due to the ‘malicious’ character of the defendants, who had engaged in systematic 
speculation.
72
 On 21 November 1922, the military tribunal in Tashkent sentenced a man to 
death for illegally purchasing cartridges from soldiers. He was ineligible for amnesty, it 
stated, as ‘professional’ purchaser of weapons for criminal use.73 A debate over the fate of 
seventeen deserters in the organizational-instructional department of the military college of 
the Supreme Court on 20 April 1923 questioned the November 1922 amnesty’s lenient stance 
on deserters. Leniency was proclaimed, but only after a long debate on the nature of desertion 
indicated unease; the euphoria of military victory, officials noted, could not conceal the 
seriousness of desertion as a crime.
74
 Yet ultimately, as with most cases, the only judgement 
open to them was assigning a crime to a category in the amnesty and then implementing the 
instructions assigned to that category, even if they disagreed. 
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Yet the bureaucratic nature of the process should not mask a key message; all courts 
were expected to enact amnesties. Instructions read more as exhortations to act than attempts 
at limitation. Later instructions on the November 1920 amnesty, for instance, urged local 
officials to view crimes that did not lead to personal gain more favourably, even suggesting 
granting complete freedom, leaving reduced sentences for ‘selfish’ crimes, including common 
crimes such as drunkenness and murder. The instructions implied that officials should err on 
the side of leniency if possible.
75
 Equally, the supreme tribunal was quick to intervene when it 
thought that amnesty should have been considered. The main military tribunal even circulated 
a note on 25 February 1921 complaining that too many military tribunals were pronouncing 
sentences ‘without the right to amnesty’, contradicting amnesty decrees and the sentiment 
behind them.
76
 All of the supreme tribunal’s decisions went to the presidium of VTsIK for 
confirmation and were often changed again, usually reducing the sentence further. 
Central authorities did not push through amnesties at any cost, however; rather, they 
insisted that regulations were adhered to and intervened accordingly, whether it led to a lesser 
or greater sentence. Tula’s provincial tribunal, for example, illegally applied several 
amnesties simultaneously in November 1922 to repeatedly reduce sentences, as did Iaroslavl’, 
who also lowered a sentence from one year to six months, before changing it illegally to a one 
million ruble fine due to the defendant’s ‘old age’.77 The supreme tribunal decreed that these 
sentences must be greater. VTsIK and Narkomiust also acted repeatedly to enforce correct 
procedure, whether reacting to appeals and chasing up cases, or spotting inconsistencies in the 
record.
78
 When Moscow tribunal reduced a sentence from five years to three years after the 
November 1920 amnesty, for instance, Narkomiust noted that the decree stipulated that 
sentences had to be reduced by two-thirds, a half or a third. It then suggested the sentence was 





Many interventions were prompted by appeals. Some appeals referred to particular 
points of an amnesty and related it to their case. Some were vaguer, noting that amnesties had 
benefited all types of criminals, implying that it was unfair that they had not been successful, 
or noted that those sentenced with them had benefited, but they had not. Some engaged with a 
perceived notion of the meaning of amnesty, claiming, for example, that an amnesty was an 
act of mercy and no-one can be denied mercy, or used the regime’s own terminology, noting 
that no-one should be refused the right to atone for their crimes. Some reminded the regime of 
its supposed sympathy to workers and peasants caught up in a process that they did not 
deserve to be.
80
 It is difficult to discover the outcome of specific appeals as information about 
cases can be scattered across archives, but it is clear that the most successful tactic was 
proving procedural error; a crime wrongly classified, a sentence incorrectly reduced, or a case 
not considered for amnesty when it should have been. Individuals were quick to appeal and 
equally quick to complain if the decision did not go their way. In 1921, for instance, 21 per 
cent of complaints (931) received by Narkomiust concerned accusations that amnesties and 
mercy had not been correctly applied, a number that equalled complaints against the Cheka 
and was only exceeded by complaints directed at people’s courts.81 
All of this demonstrates that amnesties were not intended to be purely for show. As 
the supreme tribunal reminded the Don regional tribunal, amnesties were created by the 
highest state organs and legal bodies could not refuse to implement them correctly.
82
 A 
similar message was conveyed to Saratov’s provincial tribunal when it refused amnesty for 
two brothers on the grounds that they were ‘enemies of the people’. Amnesties, the tribunal 
was told, were not concerned with whether defendants were ‘enemies of the people’ if their 
crimes were eligible under the terms decided by the state, as in this case. Saratov was ordered 





 Overall, amnesties offered a good chance of reducing a sentence. General appeals 
could work, particularly if procedural error was proved, but levels of success declined over 
time. In last six months of 1918, 47.6 per cent of appeals led to the abolition of the original 
sentence, but this fell to 24 per cent in the first half of 1919 and 7.5 per cent in 1919-20.
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Even then, most cases were retried and probably resentenced. It was possible to be considered 
for early release from late 1918 once half of a sentence had been served. Apparently, 67.4 per 
cent of those considered were released early in 1921 and a further 2.4 per cent had their 
sentences eased.
85
 There were also private acts of amnesty granted to individuals. In 1921, 
81.5 per cent were rejected, 11.4 per cent released and 7.1 per cent had their sentence 
changed; in 1922, the figures were 64, 18.6 and 17.2 per cent respectively.
86
 But although 
becoming more successful, they were less common during the civil war than later.  
The only route comparable in scale to amnesties was a rare official decree on a related 
matter. On 21 March 1921, the Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom) limited the 
maximum prison sentence to five years.
87
 This led to the reduction of thousands of sentences. 
The military college of the supreme tribunal was still rubber-stamping decisions in October to 
reduce the sentences of thousands of individuals convicted of crimes in military tribunals 
ranging from desertion, banditry, dereliction of duties and speculation, to forgery, agitation 
and drunkenness. Most had originally been sentenced to ten to twenty years.
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Indeed, Riazan’’s tribunal complained in April 1920 after being warned that it had not 
considered enough cases for amnesty that a false understanding of the state’s mercy was 
leading all criminals to expect an amnesty.
89
 If true, this would have seriously undermined the 
value of amnesties to the state. As one scholar has noted, it must be impossible for criminals 
to count on amnesties for them not to undermine the seriousness of committing crimes.
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Riazan’ may have been exaggerating, but defendants must have realised that frequent 




The Role of Amnesties 
 
Otto Kirchheimer argued that unlike individual acts of clemency, a wide-ranging amnesty 
‘must rest on a more coherent view of the desirable or necessary objectives’.91 If so, the 
Bolsheviks were never clear on these, assuming they existed. As noted, some elements of the 
amnesties were clear in their intentions, but broader motives remain obscure. The only over-
arching rationales championed by the Bolsheviks were mercy and circumstances, but if 
amnesties reflected the regime’s ‘humane’ nature, then why did violence persist? There was 
admittedly a symbolic element at work here. Continuing to dispense harsh sentences for 
crimes whilst following them with acts of mercy left some prisoners with the impression that 
they had been released due to the state’s humanity, even if they did not agree with the original 
sentence.
92
 Amnesties, then, projected an image of benevolence when little existed. 
 Equally, whilst many amnesties were clearly governed by circumstances – dealing 
with particular problems at pertinent times, linking in with other policies, or reflecting the 
changing fortunes of the Bolsheviks during the civil war – such language was not convincing 
in 1918-19 when the Bolsheviks were fighting desperately to survive. To be sure, there was 
also a symbolic element at work here as amnesties tried to portray an image of strength at a 
time when the state’s existence was perilous. 
Yet if amnesties were primarily about symbolism, one would expect them to be widely 
promoted. However, their publication was far more understated than it could have been. Most 
newspapers, such as Izvestiia and Pravda, published texts verbatim with few additional 
comments.
93
 The lack of comprehensive statistics, the absence of discussion in legal 
publications until after the civil war, and the silence in other accounts, all seem counter-
productive if the purpose was to promote and celebrate. The Bolsheviks may have realized 
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that greater publicity would ring false at a time when decrees urging merciless class war were 
being published, and amid arbitrary violence and growing authoritarianism. 
 Arguments situating amnesties within broader conceptions of crime and punishment 
are not convincing either, although, again, they contain elements of truth. In the transitional 
period before crime disappeared with the advent of socialism, crime was seen as the 
manifestation of the remnants of former practices and mentalities, of a primitive 
consciousness and of not just a criminal’s personality but their socio-economic background. 
By viewing crimes as a ‘social danger’, moreover, it was easier to see the nature of any 
danger to society changing over time depending on circumstances.
94
 Amnesties, it was argued 
later, enabled the state to respond to the hundreds of people affected by dramatic changes 
wrought by events, mistakes made through a lack of consciousness, and the rapidly changing 
conditions of civil war that quickly rendered some former crimes harmless. But whereas the 
debates surrounding amnesty became more sophisticated in the mid 1920s, reflecting the 
growth of criminology more generally,
95
 such arguments do not appear to have been made – 
publicly or privately – before 1922. Furthermore, if amnesties meant that certain crimes were 
no longer considered socially dangerous, then why did the state continue to prosecute people 
for committing the same types of crimes? 
Instead, Stuchka’s revealing comment, noted above, in July 1918 that the Bolsheviks 
were interested in expediency not mercy suggests a significant part of the attraction of 
amnesties lay in their practical benefits, an attraction that also seemed to underpin the early 
initiatives of local authorities to introduce amnesties in the first half of 1918. Ultimately, the 
state was incapable of sustaining the high levels of coercion demanded by its decrees. 
Tribunals complained of understaffing, overwork and poor finances across this period. The 
same was true of other courts and institutions, including the Cheka, although little was done 
to alleviate these problems. In August 1920, Tula’s provincial tribunal had half the amount of 
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staff that it was supposed to have and this was not uncommon.
96
 When coupled with 
escalating unrest in 1920-2, tribunals faced immense pressures. A military tribunal in Tambov 
described working long days in June 1921 dealing with over 3,000 ‘bandits’.97 
Then there were numerous complaints throughout this period concerning inadequate 
prisons. In mid-late August 1918, Sovnarkom complained to the Commissariat for Internal 
Affairs (NKVD) that it was impossible to find places in Moscow’s prisons; there were two to 
four people for every place, mentally-ill prisoners alongside others, numerous diseases and 
no-one transferred to hospital. Diseases had even spread to the surrounding urban population. 
None of this was acceptable. The NKVD’s own report in early December confirmed all of 
this, as did a report for Moscow’s provincial soviet. The latter noted that one solution might 
be to release more prisoners on bail, a suggestion that concurred with the state’s later 
emphasis on suspended sentences.
98
 Similar scenarios existed elsewhere. In 1920, Piatigorsk 
prison held four times more prisoners than intended. Typhus, diphtheria and scurvy were 
flourishing and local attempts to deal with these problems were futile.
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Narkomiust’s report to the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets in late 1920 noted 
uncertainty over the exact number of prisoners and prison spaces nationally. By 1 October 
1920, there were 48,112 known prisoners in 42,083 places (1.14 people per place), but the 
report admitted that many prisons had three people per place.
100
 A year on, the report to the 
Ninth Congress painted a worse picture; 73,194 prisoners in 60,468 places (1.21 per place) 
and constant overcrowding.
101
 Most were held in a small number of severely overcrowded 
prisons in major cities. The Third All-Russian Congress of Representatives of Soviet Justice 
also noted that prisons only had 55 per cent of their quota of staff. There was even a lack of 
security; Nizhnii Novgorod’s prison only had 78 per cent of the required number of guards. 





Unsurprisingly, it was not suggested publicly that amnesties were intended to alleviate 
these problems, but it was indicated behind the scenes. Documents on the May 1920 amnesty 
are particularly revealing in this respect. A Narkomiust circular admitted that a basic aim was 
to transfer prisoners not in isolation to forced labour without imprisonment rather than 
complete freedom from punishment.
103
 Disseminating the circular, the main railway tribunal 
emphasized that the amnesty applied ‘exclusively’ to those sentenced to a fixed term of 
imprisonment and not to other types of sentences. The aim, again, was not to release people 
from all punishment, although this was possible in certain circumstances.
104
 Another circular 
instructed railway tribunals to target those with specialist knowledge, whether railways, 
military, economic, communications, or something else.
105
 This amnesty, then, was clearly 
seen as a means of alleviating pressures on prisons, whilst continuing to punish people (in a 
way that also provided income for the state) and, for some at least, as a means to release 
much-needed specialist workers. 
Amnesties did make a difference to the justice system. The chairman of Tver’’s 
provincial tribunal noted that the November 1919 amnesty directly reduced workload,
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whilst a report to the First All-Russian Congress of Provincial Prison Departments in 
September 1920 highlighted that the November 1919 amnesty and the victories on some 
fronts of the civil war had combined to reduce the total prison population by 30 per cent. In 
terms of those serving sentences rather than awaiting trial, the impact was more dramatic with 
75-80 per cent released in some places and 46 per cent across Russia.
107
 Equally, the monthly 
statistics on prison capacity in 1920-1 reveal that prisons were emptier in December-January 
and in June after the usual amnesties.
108
 Most prisoners were serving short sentences and 
amnesties were generous to such individuals. Around a third of sentences in people’s courts 
involved imprisonment and 75 per cent were sentenced to less than a year, with 95 per cent to 
less than three years.
109
 Tribunals dispensed a higher percentage of custodial sentences, often 
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three-quarters of all sentences, although declining rapidly during this period. A survey in 
1919-20 revealed that almost 82 per cent of these sentences were less than five years.
110
 This 
fell to 36.6 per cent by the first half of 1921, before Sovnarkom prohibited sentences over five 
years in March 1921.
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Any impact was short-lived, reducing the prison population for a couple of months 
before it increased again. Moreover, growing unrest led to more criminals. In 1920, the 
number of investigations by all courts was almost 11 per cent higher than in 1919 and the 
number of sentences was 81 per cent higher. Whilst the number of prisons fluctuated, it 
remained comparable (although spaces within each prison may have increased), and was no 
more than 12 per cent higher at best.
112
 This steady increase was repeated in 1921-2. 
Thus whilst some western scholars have linked amnesties solely to the prison crisis,
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Fainblit denied that amnesties could be explained as a ‘systematic’ clearing of prisons 
(implying that such accusations had also been made by contemporaries). He did note that the 
immense task faced by punitive organs during the civil war made it ‘tragically’ inevitable that 
innocent workers and peasants would be caught up and amnesties were a periodic means of 
rectifying mistakes. However, he argued that the various amnesties lacked the continuity that 
would reflect a systematic penal policy and that this was because they reflected a more 
complex situation – the evolving political circumstances of the civil war years.114 
Kirchheimer noted that amnesties help eradicate the ‘possibly disastrous consequences 
of a wrong political choice’ and ‘may contain a compromise, expressing the present relation 
of forces between the parties concerned’.115 Whilst the Bolsheviks were unswerving in their 
‘choice’ to persecute rival political parties and made few ‘compromises’ to these parties, 
although individuals could be pardoned, a different picture emerges in the relationship with 
wider society. The civil war saw a determined effort to exert Bolshevik control over all 
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aspects of life, and this created tensions and pressures. Relations with rural Russia were a 
particular problem as peasants came to dominate investigations.  
Initially, most had committed crimes during their service in the Red Army or had 
deserted. One estimate suggested that 1.7 million people deserted from the army in 1919.
116
 
This swamped courts, especially tribunals, with thousands of cases. As most fleeing soldiers 
were of peasant origin and returned to their villages, desertion was not confined to military 
tribunals. Provincial tribunals established special departments and organized mobile tribunals 
to visit villages. Yet despite their unreliability, deserters were needed to maintain the fighting 
strength of the army and amnesties formed part of an evolving policy of incentives and 
punishments designed to combat the problem. One contemporary later argued that amnesties 
could have a significant impact as long as they were introduced when deserters were 
receptive, were not too frequent, and were applied alongside repression.
117
 Entire ‘amnesty 
weeks’ were offered in 1919. The most successful was 3-9 June, when 98,183 deserters 
returned, and it was extended for a month, raising the total to 436,398.
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Increasingly, peasants were also prosecuted for resisting the state’s food seizures and 
exceptional taxes, especially when alternatives to Bolshevik rule appeared in the form of the 
‘Green’ movement in 1920-1. Tribunals faced sentencing thousands of peasants involved in 
‘banditry’ or armed resistance. Entire villages were implicated and even if it was possible to 
incarcerate entire villages it would neither solve the economic problems nor the unrest. 
Equally, as a circular from the Cheka on 17 April 1920 to all its provincial branches advised, 
severe repression lost its impact when used constantly and thus should be reserved for the 
most harmful elements.
119
 Amnesties provided an alternative approach and helped relieve this 
pressure without publicly undermining Bolshevik principles. One observer implied that a 
special amnesty directed at entire units of the Antonov revolt in Tambov enjoyed some 
success.
120
 The leading historian of the revolt also noted varying degrees of success across 
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districts and the involvement of thousands of peasants, although he argued that amnesties had 
little impact on the bigger picture. For an amnesty to work, peasant rebels had to know about 
it, desire it and trust the Bolsheviks to honour it, all of which was doubtful.
121
 This is true, but 
there was a difference between a revolt’s leaders and its foot soldiers. As has been noted in 
the Ukraine, most peasants became ‘bandits’ because they were forcibly mobilized by local 
leaders, attempting to avoid conscription into the army, or were reacting to (or seeking 
revenge for) seizures of food and property. Most soon tired of fighting, feared for their family 
and homes, and were attracted by the offer of an amnesty, especially after rural policies eased 
in 1921. Even those who enjoyed banditry were convinced that the tide was turning against 
them in 1921 and amnesties provided an exit.
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 Finally, as the civil war ended, amnesties aided reconciliation. Amnesties were used to 
target areas of the country deeply affected by the war, an obvious example being the Crimea 
in May 1921 where the crude characterization of the ethnic Tatar population as ‘backward’ 
served to absolve them from blame for resistance.
123
 The supreme tribunal tried to restrict 
death sentences among tribunals from 1920 onwards to relieve internal dissent, a tactic that 
became even more pronounced after the November 1922 amnesty.
124
 In October 1922, the 
chairman of VTsIK, M. I. Kalinin, during a visit to Nizhnii Novgorod, sanctioned the release 
of several hundred peasants and workers convicted of petty crimes who promised to become 
productive members of society. A fortnight later, his representative wrote to a people’s court 
in the province asking whether it could change a sentence in a specific case from a fine to 
imprisonment so that the case would fall under the November 1922 amnesty and allow the 
defendant to be freed. Such actions, it was insinuated, should be more common.
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 Amnesties, therefore, were an invaluable tool in the dangerous balancing act being 
attempted by the state. Early release in any form could undermine the punitive policies of the 
state and legal sentences in particular,
126
 and the state could not allow its punitive system to 
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be seen as lacking substance. Yet it did lack substance in many ways and the state was forced 
to respond to these weaknesses. As long as the state was convinced that those convicted did 
not come to expect an amnesty as claimed by Riazan’ – and it does seem to have remained 
oblivious to this possibility – amnesties offered an ideologically acceptable way out. They 
relieved crucial pressures on the justice system, and tensions between the state and particular 
social groups, whilst maintaining the state’s basic position that certain activities were crimes 
and deserved a harsh punishment. Moreover, they did so in way that could not only be fitted 
into prevailing views on crime and punishment but, more importantly, portrayed the state in a 
merciful and humane manner. Thus despite the act and the harmful nature of that act, which 
was always stressed, there would be no further consequences, and this was solely down to the 




A study of amnesties in the late 1920s declared confidently that the November 1918 amnesty 
was a ‘historic’ document.127 Such a claim seems overblown as this was not the first Russian 
amnesty or even soviet amnesty. It was, though, the first officially-sanctioned soviet amnesty 
and established amnesties as a feature of the civil war. These amnesties were not a sign of 
mercy or humanity on the part of the Bolsheviks; they never admitted mistakes or granted 
innocence, but excused, underplayed or misrepresented crimes and their significance. The 
state was interested in expediency not mercy, and amnesties had a range of practical 
functions, not least of which was to act as a ‘safety valve’ to release burgeoning pressures on 
the fledgling justice system and tensions between state and society. 
 One scholar has noted that just as criminals must not be able to count on amnesties if 
the justice system is to remain effective, so too must an amnesty’s goals remain clear, and its 
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use restricted and carefully managed, if amnesty is not to represent the intrusion of politics 
into law.
128
 Such conditions were not met during the civil war; amnesties were frequent and 
their broad goals unclear, whilst specific parts of particular amnesties clearly did have 
political objectives. The sheer frequency of amnesties, moreover, suggests that they became 
seen by the Bolsheviks as a means to achieve political goals much in the same way as 
violence became a tool that could be readily employed to further state objectives.
129
 
These practical functions ensured that amnesties persisted after the civil war. In the 
1920s, they aided reconciliation with those who had fought for the White movement, if not its 
leaders,
130
 whilst the amnesty commemorating the revolution’s ten year anniversary reduced 
the prison population from 126,270 to 82,409 by early 1928.
131
 They played a role in Stalin’s 
Russia and afterwards, with major amnesties in 1945 and 1953 in particular, both of which 
were promoted as examples of soviet ‘humanity’.132 And amnesties continue to play a role in 
post-Soviet Russia.
133
 There has been much debate recently about the political objectives of 
the economic amnesty in July 2013 and the amnesty in December 2013 to celebrate the 
twentieth anniversary of the constitution.
134
 
 At the very least, civil war amnesties should force us to paint a more complex picture 
of repression, justice and power in the early soviet state. Amnesties reflected the weakness of 
the state’s fledgling repressive organs, which were unable to cope with the scale of the unrest 
prompted by civil war. Violence could not be the sole solution to internal opposition, and the 
continued emphasis placed centrally and locally on the justice system demonstrated the state’s 
recognition that it was not a case of justice or terror, but a judicious combination of the two. 
Amnesties may have been forced upon the state in certain respects, but at the same time, their 
development over the civil war also reflected the slow expansion of central state power. From 
steadily exerting control over amnesties in 1918 to enforcing instructions on interpreting 
amnesties and supervising local courts, central state organs took control over the timing and 
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implementation of amnesties. The history of amnesties during the civil war, therefore, is 
broadly a history of the reassertion of central authority as the turbulence of revolution started 
to come to an end. 
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